On the art of clientelism

Besides the train strike (which is basically over), there is another protest movement by the so-called “intermittents du spectacle” (henceforth “intermittents”). These are employees of the cultural/media industry who enjoy a specific unemployment benefit system. Essentially this system allows them to move back and forth between temporary employment and unemployment benefits, while other temporary workers (say in the tourism industry) would have to spend a larger fraction of their time in employment in any given year to be eligible for benefits. Beyond the eligibility rules, being on benefits has become a way of life for the intermittents. As a result, their specific unemployment benefit system has an annual deficit of about 1 billion euros, which is about the same, for 250.000 contributors, as that of the general system, which covers 16 million people. This is a transfer from the rest of society (including poorer people and people who have far less enjoyable jobs) to the intermittents.

As a result, the social partners, who are supposed to negotiate the financing of the welfare state, have regularly tried to cut on these conditions. In general there has been enough consensus between unions and employers on these reforms, because the intermittents are perceived by regular working class employees as privileged, while employers want to cut on labor costs and social security contributions. Thus the main private sector labor union, CFDT, has generally gone along with the employers’ proposals to cut the benefits. By contrast, the CGT labor union which represents mostly public sector employees is opposed to the cuts, and is active in organizing the intermittents. This is rational: While the CFDT median voter has to finance the intermittents scheme by paying higher contributions to the unemployment benefit system, public sector workers have job security and therefore do not contribute to the system.
In 2003 a reform was implemented and met by protests that perturbed a number of summer cultural festivals, up to the point that a sacred cow of French cultural mythology, the Avignon theater festival, had to be cancelled.

The same scenario is being played out right now as another agreement by the social partners has managed to put some mild cuts into place for the intermittents’ specific system. The movements should be less popular than ever, given the punitive tax increases that have been inflicted on most of the population since 2011. Nevertheless the Valls government has already yielded to the intermittents by transferring part of the costs to the tax payer; the agreements between the social partners is, then, purely cosmetic. The financing of the system is being put into the general government budget instead of the “social accounts”.

[Quite remarkably, exactly the same trick was played after the 2003 reforms. But you have to read the austere report of the “Cour des Comptes” (a committee of Cassandrae who open closets and lift carpets, then write reports on what they have found, and whose wise recommendations are invariably ignored by the politicians) to figure out how. The 2003 reform made eligibility rules stricter. But a special fund, financed out of the government budget, was put in place to guarantee a smooth landing for those who were no longer eligible. The fund was supposed to be temporary (like the jobs of the intermittents), but never trust a temporary measure.]

The existence of the intermittents is a remarkable example of political clientelism. Over the years, the eligible population has been multiplied by 10. This reflects the explosion of “cultural” spending by successive governments. Short-time unemployment compensation is a way of life for most people involved in “spectacle vivant” (theater, dance, clowns, happenings) and is also used by television and radio channels, including the State-owned ones, to pay their technicians.

The rise in the number of people working in the “cultural” sector, maintained by subsidies at an artificially large size, is a way for the political left to recruit its own electorate. The intermittents are a captive electorate, because the excess size of the entertainment sector puts them constantly under theat. They know that a substantial fraction of them would have to relocate to other industries (and lose part of their human capital) should the subsidies be cut. They also know that employers, and more generally union representatives for private sector employees, have targeted the intermittents benefit scheme as a priority for implementing cuts in social spending. This means that the threat they face is associated with the political right, implying that they need the left to be in power so as to protect their rents.

Distributing rents is not sufficient for successful clientelism. If the beneficiaries of the rents think that the opposite political party will treat them just as well, they have little incentives to reward your clientelism with votes. The rent must therefore be designed in such a way that your political opponents will try to eliminate it. By having the intermittents UB scheme being financed out of the UB system instead of the general budget, one makes the cost to other workers more apparent. That is, as you create the rent, you create a constituency against that rent at the same time. And that constituency is important in convincing your clientele that your opponents will attempt to eliminate their rent. The price to be paid for it is that the scheme will come regularly under attack; but these attacks secure loyalty among your supporters.

While the rent has to be fragile, it has to be resilient at the same time. You will need your clientele as an army to reconquer power if your opponents win the next election. But this army will not be around should the next government eliminate the scheme by a stroke of pen. To prevent that, make sure that the rent is not a discretionary subsidy scheme. Instead, it should be embodied in some form of entitlement.

The clientelism scheme will also work better if you can recruit more people into it. This means that the rent should be relatively small, so as to save resources for raising the number of beneficiaries. And if your clientele is an occupation or an economic sector, entry into it should be relatively easy (of course entry cannot be costless because that would simply eliminate the rent). Indeed many of intermittents are relatively mediocre artists who would have elected a different occupation in the absence of the scheme. Lowering standards and promoting amateurism goes hand in hand with the ability to enroll many people. Conversely, one would not go very far politically by promoting “excellence” in the arts instead.

Finally, make sure to “leverage” your clientelism by designing it so as to enroll indirect supporters in addition to direct ones. Suppose you are the mayor of a small city; you get more support by giving municipal jobs to members of large families than small families. By hiring one employee, you not only make him happy, but also his parents, sister, cousins, and so forth. In that respect, targeting the entertainment industry is a clever idea, since they can potentially enroll the audience. By targeting artists and intellectuals for your clientelism, you also achieve leverage. By virtue of their profession, these people influence public perceptions; and a dog does not bite the hands that feed him. Indeed each election a cohort of artists and intellectuals duly endorse the left in the media, while the right has to content themselves with a handful of athletes, movie stars and popular singers (who in fact reach out to far more people than the artists and intellectuals, but the point here is that many of the latter benefit from government subsidies).

I can only speculate about why over the years the right-wing governments have proven impotent in reducing the size of a scheme which, in addition to being considered unfair by many people, runs against them politically. Perhaps an explanation is that the educated bourgeoisie, who consume a substantial amount of “elite” cultural products, does not want their music and theater festivals to be sabotaged. This is a form of hostage taking but the hostages seem to be struck by some sort of Stockholm syndrome, perhaps rationally so. They contribute more to the system than they get, but as consumers of cultural products they do get part of their taxes back in the form of low prices and an abundant supply. They expect to lose more from a less profligate and more expensive cultural sector than they would gain from reduced social security contributions if the cuts were to be implemented.

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One thought on “On the art of clientelism

  1. Loosers are then the private sectors workers that have a low consumption of cultural goods. They are the real opponents of this special unemployment benefits system.
    They then suffer from the hostility of artists, who continuously try to reduce the strength of their opposition by using their wide access to the public audience (helped by journalists, who are in a similar situation of receiving heavy subsides to compensate for a low quality work) to depict them as rednecks (“beaufs”) caracterized by lower morale values (notably having to continously answer an accusation of racism, among others) and then unvalid claims.

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